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THE 1976 TERRORISM AMENDMENT
TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961*
RICHARD B. LILLICH**
THOMAS

1.

E.

AND
CARBONNEAU***

BACKGROUND OF THE AMENDMENT

Key to any successful attempt to combat international terrorism is
the elimination of sanctuary and safe-haven for terrorists. The United
States has pressed consistently for international agreements - the
anti-hijacking conventions 1 and the Internationally Protected Persons
Convention 2 being examples - requiring States either to prosecute
or extradite international terrorists found within their borders. 3 Since
its efforts to establish a "basic extradite-or-prosecute obligation" 4 have
not met with general success, the U.S. has had to consider, among
other alternatives, various unilateral responses to help curb terrorist
activities. One obvious response, drawing upon a wealth of domestic
precedents, involves the possible invocation of economic sanctions.
* ©The Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute, Inc., 1977. This article is based
upon a memorandum prepared by the Institute under a contract from the Department of State
to study "Sanctuary and Safe-Haven for Terrorists: The Relevancy of International Law." The
views expressed herein reflect the personal opinions of the authors, however, and thus are not
necessarily the views either of the Institute or the Department of State.
* * Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, and President, Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute. A.B., 1954, Oberlin College; LL.B. with Specialization in
International Affairs, 1957, Cornell Law School; LL.M. (in International Law). 1959, and
J.S.D., 1960, New York University School of Law. Member of the New York Bar.
* * * Member of the Class of 1978, University of Virginia School of Law. A.B., 1972, Bowdoin College; B.A., 1975, and M.A., 1977, Oxford University.
1. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo
Convention), Sep. 14, 1963, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768;. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, art. 7, [1971] 2
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; and Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), Sep. 23, 1971, art. 7, [1973] 1 U.S.T. 565,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
2. G.A. Res. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted
in 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 383 (1974). See Wood, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 23
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 791 (1974); and Note, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Diplomatic Agents and Other InternationallyProtected Persons: An Analysis, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 703 (1974).
3. Customary international law, at least until recently, probably did not require the prosecution or extradition of such terrorists. See Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries
to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U. L. REv. 000 (1977).

4. 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 444 (1972).
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Since. the, enactment in 1962 of the Hickenlooper Amendment, 5
which proscribed the nationalization of U.S.-owned property without
the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation,
the U.S. has threatened recipients of economic or military aid with its
termination if they engaged in various acts which conflicted with
major U.S. foreign policy objectives. Subsequent threats to terminate
aid generally have sought to achieve less parochial objectives. In September 1972, for instance, the Department of State held up a loan
to Uganda following anti-Jewish statements by President
Amin. 6 Shortly thereafter, President Nixon announced that, as required by statute, 7 he would discontinue aid to "all countries that
willfully contributed to [the U.S.] narcotics problem." 8 At the same
time, in the aftermath of the Munich Olympics tragedy, the Senate,
presaging the subject matter of this article, adopted a resolution
favoring "the suspension of United States aid to and the imposition of
economic and other sanctions against any nation which provides
sanctuary for terrorists who have injured or abused citizens or property of one nation in committing illegal or terroristic acts against
another nation or the citizens or property thereof." 9
Four years later, following the determined efforts of Representative
Wolff, Congress enacted and the President signed into law Section
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (hereinafter called the
"terrorism amendment"), which in effect codifies the policy expressed
in the 1972 Senate resolution. In its final form, Section 620A provides
that:
(a) Except where the President finds national security to require otherwise,
the President shall terminate all assistance under this [Act] any government
which aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any individual or
group which has committed an act of international terrorism and the President
may not thereafter furnish assistance to such government until the end of the
one year period beginning on the date of such termination, except that if during
its period of ineligibility for assistance under this section such government aids
or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any other individual or
group which has committed an act of international terrorism, such government's
period of ineligibility shall be extended for an additional year for each such individual or group.
(b) If the President finds that national security justifies a continuation of assis-

5. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1) (1970), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1) (Supp. V, 1975).

6. Washington Post, Sep. 15, 1972, at 16, col. 1.
7. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(a) (Supp. V, 1975).

8. Washington Post, Sep. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
9. S. Con. Res. 100, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 32651 (1972).
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tance to any government described in subsection (a) of this section, he shall
report such finding to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 10

While the terrorism amendment bears a superficial resemblance to
the Hickenlooper Amendment, it differs from Hickenlooper in two
important respects. In the first place, it is not designed to protect
only -parochial U.S. interests. Rather it is intended to combat, in the
words of Mr. Wolff, "a threat . . . to the entire fabric of international
harmony.11 Secondly, the terrorism amendment does not seek to
elevate a predominatly U.S. view to a supposedly international norm
in the way that the Hickenlooper Amendment attempted to do. Indeed, in marked contrast to its predecessor; it is an expression of
what is, presumably, a truly global outrage at the threat of ter12
rorism.
The latter point requires some expansion if the terrorism amendment is to be understood properly. One of the main arguments
against the Hickenlooper Amendment was the fact that it had little
practical effect on the problem it purported to address. 13 Critics
pointed out that States which nationalized U.S. property without
proper compensation were likely either not to be receiving U.S. aid
or, alternatively, to be receiving too little aid to dissuade them from
nationalizing. It is somewhat ironic, at first sight, that many of the
critics who made this argument against the Hickenlooper Amendment
now support a unilateral approach to terrorism which is subject to
similar criticism. Indeed, the practical ineffectiveness, argument probably is stronger in the case of the terrorism amendment, since in all
likelihood States harboring terrorists are less likely to be recipients of
U.S. aid than States nationalizing U.S. property. How then, it may
be asked, can critics of Hickenlooper support the terrorism amendment?
The answer lies in the difference in the fundamental purposes
of the two amendments. Hickenlooper, being patently parochial
legislation, of necessity had to stand or fall on its practical effectiveness. 14 Certainly it never was claimed that its presence on the
statute books was a way of winning friends for the U.S. in the international community, or of underpinning or fostering an international
.10. 22 U.S.C.A.
2371(a) (b) (Dec. 1976, .Part 1).
11. Hearings on H.R. 11963 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 685 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
.12. The UN, for instance, has condemned international terrorism. See G.A. Res. 3034, 27
U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 119, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
13. R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 140-45 (1965).

14. It fell. See Lillich, Requiem for Hickenlooper, 69 AM. J. INTL. L. 97 (1975).
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consensus on the problem to which it was directed. A contrario sensu, the immediate practical effectiveness of the terrorism amendment
is of only relatively minor concern. What was emphasized in the debates by Mr. Wolff was its potential value as an unequivocal statement by the U.S. of its intention to stand firmly behind, and even
actively to advance, the emerging international law norm condemning
terrorism:
Perhaps this [amendment] is nothing more than going on record; unfortunately,
however, in no piece of legislation that we have had has the United States really
gone on record as being opposed to terrorism. It would be one more method,
one additional area of voicing our opposition to international anarchy taking
place. The fact that you say that it might not stop it, well, without this we have
not been able to stop it either.
We should try to do something. We have tried to put amendments before the
UN to no avail and it would seem that we are in effect saying that we throw up
our hands and we can't do anything against terrorism.1 5

This quotation clearly reveals that a major, and perhaps the major,
impact of the terrorism amendment will be its firm underscoring of
the U.S.'s commitment to the anti-terrorism cause. While of course
the fact that its practical effect upon other States will be small is to
be regretted, the legislation remains a valuable expression of an
emerging international law norm.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENT

In December 1975, Mr. Wolff, who the preceding month had contended that "the U.N. has proven itself to be incapable of dealing
16
with the problem of international terrorism in a meaningful way,"
offered a draft amendment to the International Security Assistance
and Arms Export Act of 1976.17 In brief, the amendment contained

15. Hearings, supra note 11, at 687.
16. 121 CONG. REc. H11295 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1975).
17. The text of the draft amendment reads as follows:
Sec. 620A. Prohibition Against Furnishing Assistance to Countries Which Grant
Sanctuary to International Terrorists.--4a) Except under extraordinary circumstances,
the President shall terminate all assistance under this Act to any government which
grants sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or group that has committed an act
of international terrorism and may not thereafter furnish assistance to such government
until the end of the one year period beginning on the date of such termination, except
that if during its period of ineligibility for assistance such country grants sanctuary
from prosecution to any other individual or group that has committed an act of international terrorism, such country's period of ineligibility shall be extended for an additional year for each such individual or group.
(b) If the President determines that extraordinary circumstances exist which justify a
continuation of assistance to any government described in subsection (a), he shall re-
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two provisions: the first providing that the President should terminate
all assistance under the act for a one year period to any country
granting sanctuary to international terrorists; 1 8 and the second permitting the President to continue such assistance if he found that
"extraordinary circumstances" existed. 1 9 A concurrent resolution device, 20 by which Congress could overrule this finding without. the
President's signature, greatly limited his discretion in this regard.
The draft amendment differed from the enacted version of the terrorism amendment in two important respects: (1) it lacked the legal
phrase "aids and abets," 2 1 but (2) it contained the all-important concurrent resolution device.
Senator Stone introduced a similar draft amendment in the Senate. 22 This version provided that the President should terminate all
assistance under the act for a one year period to any country aiding
or abetting international terrorists except where -he found national
port such extraordinary circumstances to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Assistance may not be furnished to such government if the Congress, within 30 calendar days of receiving such
report, adopts a concurrent resolution stating in effect that it does not find that extraordinary circumstances exist which justify assistance to such government. Hearings,
supra note 11, at 684-85.

18. A chain of states might run afoul of this proscription in a given case if, after being
granted sanctuary in State A, an international terrorist later moved freely to and in States B and
C. For a discussion of analogous situations involving active or passive actions giving rise to
responsibility on the part of a chain of States, see Lillich & Paxman, note 3 supra.
19. See text at and accompanying note 23 infra.
20. For a definition of the term concurrent resolution device, see 1 CCH CONG. INDEX
(Senate, 94th Cong. 1975-76), at 4 (1976).
21. The Senate later added the phrase. See text at and accompanying notes 24, 25 & 26
infra.
22. The text of the draft amendment reads as follows:
Sec. 620A. Prohibition Against Furnishing Assistance to Countries Which Aid or
Abet International Terrorists.(a) Except where the President finds national security to require otherwise the President shall terminate all assistance under this Act to any Government which aids or
abets any individual or group that has committed an act of international terrorism, and
may not thereafter furnish assistance to such government until the end of the one year
period beginning on the date of such termination, except that if during its period of
ineligibility for assistance such country aids or abets any other individual or group that
has committed an act of international terrorism such country's period of ineligibility
shall be extended for an additional year for each such individual or group.
(b) If the President finds the above circumstances exist which justify a continuation
of assistance to any government described in subsection (a), he shall report such circumstances to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate. Assistance may not be furnished to such government
if the Congress, within 30 calendar days of receiving such report, adopts a concurrent
resolution stating in effect that it does not find that the above circumstances exist
which justify assistance to such government. 122 CONG. REC. S1751 (daily ed. Feb. 17,
1976).
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security to require otherwise. Presidential discretion again was limited by a concurrent resolution device. In addition to substituting 23a
"national security" for an "extraordinary circumstances" exception,
the Senate draft amendment introduced, upon the insistence of
Senator Javits, 24 the "aids and abets" concept. The importance of this
latter variation is twofold. First, by drawing upon the language of the
criminal law it underscored the criminal nature of the conduct of
States which assist international terrorists. However strong the political overtones may be in a particular terrorist situation - whether
from the standpoint of the terrorists' own motivations or from the
standpoint of the State in some way involved with them - Senator
Javits believed that such overtones should not "decriminalize" the
25
conduct of States assisting terrorists. Secondly, by cutting off aid
not just when States grant sanctuary from prosecution to international
terrorists, but when they aid or abet such terrorists, the Senate draft
amendment considerably widened the scope of the proscription, a reby Senator Javits if not appreciated by other
sult clearly intended
26
Congressmen.
As revised by a conference committee, the terrorism amendment
basically followed the Senate model. Indeed the Conference Report
states that the committee "adopted the Senate version with an
amendment to include the House provision by requiring termination
of assistance to any country which aids or abets by granting sanctuary
23. The use of the phrase "extraordinary circumstances" in the original House draft was not
without precedent. It had been used previously in a 1974 Human Rights Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act (see 22 U.S.C. § 2304[a] [Supp. V, 1975]). The substitution of the phrase
"national security" for the phrase "extraordinary circumstances" constitutes an unfortunate
change. The use of the latter phrase is more accurate in the terrorism context since, for example, it accounts for the hostage situation, while the former phrase does not unless it is given an
exceedingly, if not excessively, broad construction. The substitution of the phrase probably was
motivated by the fact that the provisions in 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1970) concerning the termination
of aid included exceptions which were worded in terms of "national security," e.g., "[p]rovided,
that the President does not find such action contrary to the national security."
24. "[T]he phrase 'aids or abets' is a phrase of the well-established criminal law, has been
construed very often, and therefore is not an uncertain phrase to be construed in the first
instance for this particular amendment .... 122 CONG. REc. S1753 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976).
25. It should be noted that, while the phrase "aids or abets" represents a well-defined legal
concept in U.S. domestic law, its status in international law is less clear. There is some precedent, however, as to what the phrase might mean in the context of state responsibility for
injuries to aliens. See Lillich & Paxman, note 3 supra.
26. "'Aid or abet,' to a criminal, whether he is a local criminal or an international criminal,
is a very well-known term. It requires some intent, it requires some concealment or coverup.
In other words, it does not matter whether they give him up or not. That isonly a question of
whether they are aiding or abetting him after the commission of his crime. The crime is what is
the essential point." 122 CONG. REc. S1755 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976). Compare with text at and
accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
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from prosecution to any individual or group that has committed an
act of international terrorism." 27 The italicized portion of the above
quotation, however, is undercut consideraly by what follows. While
the revised amendment did contain "aid and abet" terminology, this
language was linked solely to the granting of sanctuary. 28 Thus in
effect the narrow proscription of the original House version pre29
vailed.
On May 7, 1976, President Ford vetoed the International Security
Assistance and. Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which contained the
above terrorism amendment. The President's opposition centered
upon several provisions which he deemed violative of the constitutional. separation of powers. 30 Although the terrorism amendment
was not mentioned specifically, it, like the provisions the President
did single out, contained the concurrent resolution device. For
example, in his veto message the President cited the human rights
provision, a provision parallel to the terrorism amendment. 3 1 He
characterized it as an "unwise restriction seriously inhibiting [his]
ability to implement a coherent and consistent foreign policy." 32 He
considered such provisions to be "awkward and ineffective device[s]"
which were, in effect, "simple legalistic tests" which ignored complex
33
policy considerations.
Prior to the President's veto, Executive Branch opposition to
further limitations on the President's discretion in the foreign
policymaking area already had become apparent. This opposition,
however, reflected the confusion mentioned earlier concerning the
dual purposes of the legislation: on the one hand, it purported to be a
practical "weapon" against terrorism, and, on the other hand, its real
value, arguably, came from its being a norm-generating expression of
shared U.S. and international community policy. The Department of
State, in its evaluation of the terrorism amendment, principally
criticized the first purpose and generally discounted the importance
of the second. In a series of five "talking points," it argued that:
[1] Denying or terminating development and securitv assistance tinder the
FAA will not necessarily deter a country from granting sanctuary to terrorists.

27. H.R. REP. No. 1013, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69-70 (1976) (emphasis added).
28. The revised amendment required the President to terminate aid to any State "which
aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any individual or group which has
committed an act of international terrorism.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
29. Compare with text at and accompanying note 26 supra.
30. Press Release from the Office of the White House Press Secretary, May 7, 1976, at 1.

31. Id. at 3.
32. id.
33. id.
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[2] There may be cases where transfer to a safe haven in another country is
arranged for terrorists in order to avert the slaughter of hostages. This amendment would jeopardize this humane alternative.
[3] This amendment could jeopardize our efforts to achieve a peaceful solution
in the Middle East and unfairly- punish nations that are not in a position to
control the activities of terrorists who use their territory as a sanctuary.
[4] There is no universally-accepted definition of "international terrorism."
The term has been used with widely differing intents and meanings - usually
with a political objective in mind. Thus one can imagine situations wherein the
amendment, if adopted, could adversely affect a country that has been victimized by terrorist operations.
[5] The problem of terrorism is addressed effectively and comprehensively in
a multilateral context. Unilateral threats of aid termination could slow acceptance
of cooperative efforts such as the anti-hijacking conventions. 3

In Congress, opponents of the terrorism amendment stressed three
major points. First, they emphasized the fact that States which had
granted sanctuary to terrorists in the past did not receive U.S. aid
and thus were immune from the amendment's thrust. 3 5 Secondly,
they asserted that the amendment placed undue emphasis upon a
single factor in complex State-to-State relations. 36 Finally, they
pointed out that the lack of any definition of "international terrorism"
created potential problems. 3 7 All three arguments, of course, are
found in the Department of State's five "talking points." They ultimately failed to prevail in Congress, which reenacted the terrorism
amendment, minus the concurrent resolution device, that now graces
the statute books as Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961.38

III.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE AMENDMENT

The three arguments mentioned in the final paragraph of the preceding section bear closer examination than they were given either
by the Department of State or by Congress. The first one simply
reflects the confusion mentioned twice above over the dual purposes
of the terrorism amendment, a point that need not be repeated again
in detail. Suffice it to say that the amendment may have long-range
value even if its immediate effectiveness proves to be zero.
In response to the second argument, it might be asked which is the
more important factor in determining U.S. foreign policy: a consider-

34. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Termination of Assistance to Countries Giving Sanctuary to
International Terrorists, 1976 (unpublished).
35. Hearings, supra note 11, at 686.
36. Id. at 687.
37. 122 CONG. REc. S1754 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976).
38. See text at note 10 supra.
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ation of complex State-to-State relations in a given case or a firm
general stand behind the emerging international law norm condemning international terrorism. Presidential flexibility in the conduct of
foreign relations is an important consideration, admittedly, and of
course it is not necessarily incompatible with a firm stand against
international terrorism. Such flexibility, though, should not extend to
the point where the President engages in a consistent pattern of tradingconcessions to criminals either for short-run objectives (e.g., freeing of hostages) or long-run advantages (e.g, the maintenance of
"friendly relations" with an oil-exporting State). The problem of terrorism is too important for it to be treated as just another factor in
the diplomatic decision-making process. Surely the time has come to
reconsider the unofficial U.S. position of what might be called "negotiable disapproval" vis-i-vis terrorists. The terrorism amendment reflects Congress' desire for such reconsideration, while at the same
time acknowledging the realities of international life by providing a
"national security" exception for use in the hard case.
The third objection raised against the amendment, both by the
Department of State and by various members of Congress, concerns
the amendment's failure to define the operative term "international
terrorism." Curiously, this objection, voiced chiefly by Senator
Abourezk, embraced two diametrically opposite points of view. One
was that the concept of terrorism is too vague to constitute a standard
for judging certain behavior as criminal; the other was that, on the
contrary, the amendment is drawn with overly-great precision, so
that it very skillfully exempts Israeli military operations from its am9
bit.3
Regarding the first point, Mr. Wolff acknowledged that:
there is no widely accepted international definition of terrorism. I would
suggest, however, that the language contained in ...the U.S. draft to the United Nations on the "Convention for the Prevention or Punishment of Certain
Acts of International Terrorism" provides a basis for further consideration.
This act, of course, would have to meet the other tests, but in the end, I fear
that the definitions of international terrorism are similar to Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's comment on obscenity when he said "I know it when I see
it."

40

It may be that, as unsatisfactory as this solution to the problem appears at first blush, it would create less difficulty than might be imagined in determining whether or not a given incident constitutes ter-

39. 122 CONG. REc. S1754-55 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976).
40. Hearings, supra note 11, at 685. Cf. Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 U. AKRON L. REv. 380 (1974).
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rorism. Critics of the amendment are correct, to be sure, when they
assert that criminal statutes should not be overly vague as to the type
of activity that is being proscribed. 4 1 Yet can one say that the words
"international terrorism" are not, in and of themselves,. just as clear
as any purported definition or restatement of them would be? Such
was the belief of the U.S. delegation to the UN in 1972 when it
submitted its draft Convention for the Prevention or Punishment of
Certain Acts of International Terrorism, 4 2 which focused on operative
acts and purposely left the term undefined. Criticism of this approach
has not been lacking, both within and without the UN, but it should
be noted that the critics themselves have not met with conspicuous
success in their own attempts to frame a fixed definition for so fluid
an offense. 4 3

The second point emphasizes the fact that military operations,
which can be viewed as State terrorism, do not fall within the
amendment. This exclusion has the effect, critics of the amendment
have argued, of giving covert approval to such events as Israeli Air
Force raids on villages and refugee camps in southern Lebanon. In
Senator Abourezk's view, for instance, the amendment is not aimed
at all varieties of international terrorism, but only at one limited type
of such terrorism, a type which would cover many acts committed by
Palestinian freedom fighters driven to desperation by a generation of
mistreatment at Israeli (and also U.S.) hands. 44
This last argument comes as a reprise to persons who have watched
the UN vacillate on the terrorism issue since 1972. One should attack
the causes, and not simply the manifestations, of terrorism, the argument at the UN has run. It reflects the fallacious viewpoint that, if
one piece of remedial legislation does not accomplish everything to
be desired, then it should not be enacted, even if it admittedly might
solve part of the problem.

41. 122 CONG. REc. S1754 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976).
42. U.N. Doe. A/C.6/L.850 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATEmALS 1382 (1972).
43. Leaving the term undefined in the amendment allows the U.S. to take into account, in
the words of Senator Stone, "the evolving and emerging patttern of criminal activities" that may
be characterized as "international terrorism." 122 CoiqG. REc. S1754 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976).
44. Id. at S1755:
If you were sincere in wanting to stop terrorism [... ,] you would, put a stop to
Israel's dropping bombs in southern Lebanon on the civilian population and, especially, with American cluster bombs and with American airplanes and American financing.
That is the way to stop terrorism, to do it everywhere and not just in one part of the
world.
It would seem to me this is a very, very cynical amendment, one designed to continue the terrorism [in the Middle East] and not to put a stop to it for a fact.
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No one disputes that State terrorism is a serious problem and that
it certainly deserves more adequate scrutiny and condemnation than
it has received to date. The fact is, though, that there already exists a
large body of conventional international law regulating State terrorism
in.the armed conflict context. 45 Additionally, there already exists a
substantial and developing body of customary international law governing the responsibility of States for terrorist activities which they
either initially sponsor or subsequently assist in accessory-after-thefact fashion. 4 6 Moreover, another provision in the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, requires the termination of U.S. aid to
States which utilize terror against their own citizens, 4 7 the same sanction device found in the terrorism amendment. 48 Finally, there is no
dispute that the underlying causes of terrorism should be studied and
then eliminated. The recognition of this fact, however, does not mean
that one should stand idly by while terrorist outrages continue. No
one today would contend seriously that the U.S. should limit itself to
studying the causes and alleviating the impact of racism, all the time
foregoing the opportunity to pass laws against racial discrimination.
The same reasoning applies in, the terrorism field.
One additional response should be made at this point about the
Department of State's fifth talking point.4 9 It is true that multilateral,
as opposed to unilateral, action against terrorism is the preferable
course of action. If the Department is correct in its assertion that the
terrorism amendment "could slow acceptance of cooperative efforts
such as the anti-hijacking conventions," then the amendment would
indeed lose much of its raison d'etre as an effort at promoting inter45. See Convention with Respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land, Jul. 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803 (1902), T.S. No. 403; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (1909), T.S. No. 539; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364: and
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. For a discussion of the evolution of international
law norms regarding terrorism, see Paust, A Survey of Possible Legal Responses to International
Terrorism:.Prevention, Punishment, and Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INrL & Corip. L. 431
(1975).
46. See Lillich & Paxman, note 3 supra.
47. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
48. Hearings, supra note 11, at 686 (Mr. Wolff):
A further point I would like to make is that this amendment can be considered a corollary to the human rights amendment approved by this committee last year. My amendment is
directed toward terrorism created by individuals or groups.
Last year's amendment-was directed toward terror by states. Thus, with the inclusion of
my amendment, we will have an even-handed approach to the problem of terrorism and avoid
an accusation that we are 'concentrating on but one form, an accusation that has hindered past
U.S. attempts to curb terrorism.
49. See text at note 34 supra.
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national law. As a matter of fact, however, the Department's fear in
this regard is largely groundless, for the lamentable reason that the
anti-hijacking conventions mentioned are not achieving universal
adherence, States harboring hijackers naturally having little motivation to ratify them. Moreover, those conventions cover only one facet
of terrorist activities. As for multilateral action against terrorism in
general, there is little possibility of any effective action being taken in
the foreseeable future. 5 0 In any event, the problem of terrorism is
too urgent for the U.S. simply to sit and wait for international agreement to materialize.
IV.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AMENDMENT

Having analyzed the arguments advanced against the substance of
the terrorism amendment and found them wanting, one still is left
with the problem of whether the particular version of the amendment
enacted is the preferable one. In this regard, a strong case can be
made for the House draft amendment originally presented by Mr.
Wolff, as opposed to the legislation which finally became law. The
major difference between the two bills, it will be recalled, was the
presence in the former, and the absence in the latter, of the concurrent resolution device.
This difference has an important bearing on the effectiveness of the
legislation, although not in the way that normally is supposed.
Lawyers especially find it virtually impossible to resist engaging in
what often become artificial and theoretical debates about Executive
and Legislative Branch prerogatives in the foreign policy area. On the
part of the Executive Branch, there is a "knee jerk" unwillingness to
accept any limitation on the President's foreign policymaking powers.
The implication is not just that the President is in a better position to
formulate U.S. policy in regard to matters such as international terrorism, but actually that he is in the only effective position to do so.
In evaluating the terrorism amendment, the Executive Branch apparently was prepared to accept only legislation which left the President's discretion relatively unfettered.

50. The UN General Assembly recently established a 35-member committee to draft an
international convention prohibiting the taking of hostages. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1976, at 3,
col. 3. The committee is to begin work in August 1977 and complete a draft text in time for
submission to the next session of the General Assembly in September. Id., Dec. 10, 1976 §A,
at 12, col. 1. What kind of convention will emerge from the committee and what its reception
will be in the General Assembly are matters of speculation. Even if the effort is unexpectedly
successful, however, the convention will proscribe only the taking of hostages and not terrorist
acts in general.
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Terrorism Amendment

As fascinating as such debates are from an academic standpoint,
they nonetheless seem to miss the real issue at stake, which is just
how firm and unequivocal a statement the U.S. is willing to make to
the world community on the subject of international terrorism. The
congressional debates, significantly, yield little evidence that great
practical differences would ensue depending upon whether the President or Congress had the ultimate power to decide on cut-offs of
U.S. aid under the amendment. The important point, though, is not
that Congress would make better, or even different, substantive decisions in this area than the President. It is that if Congress were to
have been given the ultimate decisionmaking power, then that bestowal of power would have been perceived by other countries,
rightly or wrongly, as reflecting an especially forthright stand against
terrorism.
The theory behind this last point is that any issue that is lifted out
of the workings of day-to-day professional diplomacy and placed in
the hands of the public at large (through the medium of the Congress) is one about which the public is particularly concerned. In one
sense, it is true that the step might be viewed as being a regressive
one, tying the President's hands in his direction of U.S. foreign policy. In another and more vital sense, though, it would be a progressive step in that U.S. concern over terrorism would be viewed as
being a widespread public concern, rather than merely another of
many factors in the diplomatic decision-making process; the international norm-generating capacity of the amendment thereby would
have become all the greater. The strength of the original House draft
amendment thus lay not in its reliance on the wisdom of Congress
rather than that of the President per se, but rather in the forcefulness
of its condemnation of international terrorism.
Nevertheless, despite the dropping of the concurrent resolution
device, Mr. Wolff and the supporters of the original House amendment have achieved a meaningful compromise. At the worst, their
efforts to combat and condemn international terrorism will prove
futile, serving only as a vent for congressional frustrations. At best,
the amendment will deter some States from granting sanctuary and
also will contribute, incrementally, to the continuing development of
an international law norm condemning terrorism. "Perhaps this is
nothing more than going on record," Mr. Wolff realistically acknowledged, in remarks already quoted above, adding pointedly:
[U]nfortunately, however, in no piece of legislation that we have had has the
United Stetes really gone on record as being opposed to terrorism. It would be
one more method, one additional area of voicing our opposition to international
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anarchy taking place. The fact that you say that it51might not stop it, well, without this we have not been able to stop it either.

It is difficult to differ with this sober assessment of the 1976 terrorism
amendment.
51. See text at note 15 supra.

